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r. Pangloss might have described the
performance of the U.S. economy dur-
ing 1997 as “the best of all possible
worlds,” and in many respects he would
have been correct.  The economy grew
rapidly throughout the year while most
measures of inﬂation fell steadily.  More
important, the strength of the economy
generated visible beneﬁts: nearly 3.2 mil-
lion new jobs, a higher average real wage,
and a Federal government’s budget that
was within whispering distance of balance.
Clearly, Dr. Pangloss was not a
practitioner of the dismal science, otherwise
he would have found 1997 a trying time.
Throughout the year, economists struggled
to identify the factors that produced strong
real growth and lower-than-expected inﬂa-
tion.  This was especially important for the
members of the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) because traditional signals
of inﬂationary pressures—monetary aggre-
gates and strength of the real economy—
provided little guidance.  The performance
of the U.S. economy during 1997 indicated
aggregate supply factors were at play as well.
Thus the FOMC had to sort through aggre-
gate demand and supply factors to
determine inﬂationary pressures.
Some economists speculated that the
U.S. economy had entered a new era of
rapid sustainable growth.  Low inﬂation
and strong growth during 1996 and 1997
fueled such speculation.  If true, any
factors that produced such outcomes were
long lived and required a different set of
policy responses.  Such considerations
likely motivated the questions, “What is
behind the good performance of the
economy?” and “Will it persist?” during
Alan Greenspan’s Humphrey-Hawkins 
testimony in July 1997.
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1 Members of the FOMC cited
these factors as potential
sources of favorable inﬂation
numbers.  Oil prices fell nearly
30 percent during 1997.  The
medical care services compo-
nent of the CPI rose 2.9 per-
cent in 1997, its lowest rate
since the 1960s.  The technical
revisions to the CPI probably




1997 marked the sixth year of the cur-
rent expansion.  As summarized in Figure
1 and Table 1, the economy showed
remarkable strength and lower inﬂation
during the year.  Real Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) grew 3.7 percent between
the fourth quarter of 1996 and the fourth
quarter of 1997.  The civilian unemployment
rate fell steadily throughout the year, starting
the year at 5.1 percent and ﬁnishing at 4.3
percent.  When compared to 1996, all
measures of inﬂation were lower in 1997.
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose a
scant 1.7 percent in 1997, after rising 3.3
percent in 1996, and the Producers Price
Index fell 1.2 percent during 1997.
The strength of the economy and
lower inﬂation made it more difﬁcult to
formulate appropriate policy because they
implied aggregate supply factors had
affected the economy.  An increase in
demand produces higher prices and higher
output, whereas an increase in supply gen-
erates lower prices and higher output.
Since the data showed that output and
inﬂation were moving in opposite
directions, aggregate demand analysis was
not sufﬁcient to determine how much
inﬂationary pressures existed in the
economy.  The FOMC, therefore, discussed
factors that affected aggregate supply.
There were several candidates: job insecu-
rity, oil prices, slow growth of health care
expenses, increased competition (both
domestic and international), technical
changes to the CPI, the lack of pricing
power and increases in labor productivity.1
Productivity
Of the potential factors listed, labor
productivity deserved careful consideration
because it allows companies to produce
more with a given amount of labor, thereby
reducing the cost of production.  Most
likely all other factors were temporary.
Although the observed higher productivity
may have been temporary as well, it also
had the potential to have a much longer
effect on the economy.  The May meeting’s
minutes noted,
Members focused on the possible role
of faster-than-reported increases in pro-
ductivity as a key explanation for the
benign behavior of inﬂation in current
circumstances...The ongoing develop-
ment and spreading adoption of auto-
mated equipment along with the
increasing skills and other infrastruc-
ture needed to use it effectively
appeared to be creating growing efﬁ-
ciencies or synergies that were marked-
ly enhancing productivity and enabling
ﬁrms to hold the line on prices and
maintain high proﬁt margins.
The growth rates of productivity and
investment were two striking features of
the U.S. economy’s performance in 1997.
After languishing for decades, labor
productivity of nonfarm businesses during
1997 grew at a rate near its post-war
average (see Table 1) and followed a
respectable performance in 1996.  Labor
productivity in the manufacturing sector
grew even more quickly and had been
The U.S. Economy in 1997
Nonfarm Business
Period  Real GDP  Inﬂation - CPI  Output per Hour  Unemployment Rate
1997  3.7  1.7  2.1  5.0
1948-1997  3.5  3.9  2.1  5.7
1948-1969  4.5  2.2  3.2  4.7
1970-1997  2.8  5.3  1.4  6.6
Note: Real GDP and Inﬂation are fourth quarter over fourth quarter growth rates.
Table 1FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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2 The Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1978,
also known as the Humphrey-
Hawkins Act, requires the
Federal Reserve to report target
ranges for monetary aggregates
to Congress.  Pakko (1995)
discusses the role of monetary
aggregates as intermediate 
targets of monetary policy.
3 Ritter (1993) discusses the




strong since the end of the last recession.
In addition, investment as a fraction of
GDP continued to grow and reached its
highest level since the end of World War
II, adding to the economy’s productive
capacity.  Investment in computers and
other information technologies grew espe-
cially quickly during the year.
AGGREGATE DEMAND
Although falling inﬂation and rapid
growth suggested a positive shift of aggre-
gate supply, there were indications that
aggregate demand had increased as 
well, and signaled a possible source of
inﬂationary pressures.  Growth of real
GDP was strong during 1997 and came 
on the heels of strong growth during 1996.
Real GDP surpassed its post-war average
and also surpassed most estimates of 
the potential growth rate of GDP .
Moreover, various factors that support
aggregate demand showed strength
throughout the year.  Personal income,
supported by large net job creation, grew
rapidly throughout the year; household
wealth increased substantially as the stock
market continued to rise; and consumer
conﬁdence rose to record levels.  All 
these factors provided the wherewithal 
for robust consumer spending.  Businesses
continued to invest as the cost of capital
fell and proﬁts rose, further adding to
aggregate demand.
Monetary Aggregates
Nearly all economists believe excesive
money growth causes inﬂation.  As recently
as the early 1990s, the behavior of M2 was
an important input into monetary policy.2
Unfortunately, the unexpected and
persistent rise of M2 velocity during the
early part of this decade diminished its rel-
evance for monetary policy.3 1997 brought
M2 back into the policy discussion as the
velocity of M2 showed signs of stabilizing
at a higher level.
During 1997, FOMC members noted
the growth of M2 above or at the upper
end of its target range, possibly signaling
an expansionary monetary policy, thereby
stimulating aggregate demand and fueling
future inﬂation.  Certainly, most measures
of economic activity were high throughout
the year, and asset prices rose sharply.  But,
could the monetary aggregates be trusted
once again to send reliable signals about
inﬂationary pressures?  Such issues were
most likely on the FOMC members’ minds
as they discussed policy.  But in the end,
the committee decided to watch the aggre-
gates carefully but sought other indicators
of aggregate demand pressures.
...any tendency for growth of the
monetary aggregates to move outside
the Committee’s ranges would not in
itself call for a policy adjustment but
would continue to be interpreted in
the context of a broad range of busi-
ness and ﬁnancial developments bear-
ing on the prospective performance of
the overall economy.
...the period of more predictable M2
and M3 behavior was still relatively
brief and such behavior had occurred
at a time of generally settled condi-
tions in ﬁnancial markets and the
overall economy.  The prospective
performance of these aggregates in
periods of rapid changes in ﬁnancial
and economic conditions was still an
open question, and in light of the
uncertainties that were involved the
members concluded that it would be
premature to place increased reliance
on them in the conduct of policy.
Resource Constraints
So, the FOMC turned to the other 
traditional indicator of excess aggregate
demand and inﬂationary pressures:
resource constraints, which embody the
notion that prices increase when demand
exceeds supply.  Two notable and
somewhat related concepts of resource
constraints are measured by the Phillips
curve and the difference between actual
and potential GDP .
The Phillips curve suggests that 
the amount of slack in the labor marketFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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4 Estimates of NAIRU also consider
other factors like demographics.
Gordon (1997) discusses recent
developments and estimates of
NAIRU.  Staigler, Stock, and
Watson (1997) suggest that
the uncertainty of a NAIRU esti-
mate is quite large, perhaps too
large for policy makers.
5 Under certain conditions these
two relationships may be
mapped one-to-one onto each
other.  Okun’s law is one such
empirical relationship between
the output gap and employ-
ment gap.  It states that a 
1 percentage point drop in
unemployment is associated
with a 3 percentage point
increase in output.
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effects prices in the short run by affecting
production costs.  Strong aggregate demand
increases demand for labor and thus increases
wages.  Rising labor costs increase  the cost
of production which ﬁrms pass along to con-
sumers  as higher prices.  Although price
measures did not show higher inﬂation  in
1997, the unemployment rate fell substan-
tially, many new jobs were created and
several measures  of labor costs, including
employment cost index, accelerated.  The
February FOMC minutes noted,
If labor markets remained under pres-
sure, nominal compensation costs
were likely to pick up at some point
as one-time savings in worker beneﬁt
costs ran out and as workers became
less willing to trade off lower wages
for increased security; such a develop-
ment would foster increases in labor
costs that ultimately would feed
through to higher prices.
Economists often translate the idea
into a non-linear relationship between
unemployment and inﬂation by estimating
a threshold beyond which inﬂation accel-
erates.  This measure is called NAIRU,
non-accelerating inﬂation rate of unemploy-
ment;  by deﬁnition, unemployment rates
above (below) NAIRU are associated with
accelerating (decelerating) inﬂation.  Most
estimates of NAIRU were near 5.5 percent.4
The pace of economic activity
produced strong employment growth and
thus a lower unemployment rate.  At the
end of 1996, the unemployment rate was
5.3 percent—a rate below most estimates
of NAIRU—and it fell steadily to 4.7 percent
by the end of 1997.  Moreover, the unem-
ployment rate during 1997 was below  the
post-war average and signiﬁcantly below
the average for the post-1970 era.
The other measure of resource
constraint is the gap between actual and
potential GDP.  The idea is similar to the
Phillips curve with potential GDP replacing
NAIRU.5 Like the difference between the
unemployment rate and NAIRU, the differ-
ence between actual and potential GDP
measures strength of demand relative to
supply.  The measure suggests that if aggre-
gate demand grows more rapidly than an
economy’s ability to produce, inﬂationary
pressures develop.  If the growth of real GDP
is above (below) that of potential GDP, inﬂa-
tion  accelerates (decelerates).  Chairman
Greenspan noted in his July Humphrey-
Hawkins testimony, “[W]e endeavor to prevent
strains from developing in our economic
system, which long experience tells us produce
bottlenecks,  shortages, and inefﬁciencies.
These  eventually create more inﬂation, which
undermines  economic expansion and limits
the longer term  potential of the economy.”
Economists often characterize an
economy’s productive capacity using an
aggregate production function that has two
components: labor and labor productivity.
So, an estimate of potential GDP requires
estimates of those two factors.  The long-
run growth rate of the labor force equals
the growth rate of the population, currently
about 1 percent.  The other variable, labor
productivity, is much harder to forecast
because it incorporates factors such as the
rate of net capital accumulation and tech-
nological change.  One simple guess at the
growth rate of labor productivity uses a
long-run historical average as an estimate
of the growth of labor productivity.  Labor
productivity growth has averaged 1.4 percent
since 1970.  Combining the population
growth rate and the recent growth rate of
labor productivity yields a potential growth
rate of the U.S. economy of 2.4 percent,
near most estimates of potential GDP growth.
LONGEVITY AND LAGS
Complications introduced by potential
shifts of aggregate supply were compounded
by uncertainty about how long such aggre-
gate supply enhancing factors would last.  If
the productivity continued to grow rapidly,
potential GDP would be higher.  Perhaps they
would last as long as those factors possibly
affecting aggregate demand.  If the aggregate
supply and demand factors had similar dura-
tions, perhaps no monetary policy response
was necessary.
Determining the duration of such
changes may be easy, in hindsight, but it isFEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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difﬁcult to do while one is in the midst of
them.  As Chairman Greenspan stated in his
July testimony before Congress,
We do not now know, nor do I sus-
pect can anyone know, whether cur-
rent developments are part of a once
or twice in a century phenomenon
that will carry productivity trends
nationally and globally to a new high-
er track, or whether we are merely
observing some unusual variations
within the context of an otherwise
generally conventional business 
cycle expansion.
Still, advocates of the long-lived, pro-
ductivity-increase hypothesis saw recent
developments in information technology
and recent cost-cutting measures as the
primary drivers of productivity gains.  The
proponents of the structural change viewpoint
noted the persistent growth of investment,
especially in information technologies.6
Chairman Greenspan speculated in his July
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony, “What we
may be observing in the current environment
is a number of key technologies, some even
mature, ﬁnally interacting to create signiﬁ-
cant new opportunities for value creation.”
The committee members also had to
consider monetary policy lags because any
policy actions might have accentuated eco-
nomic ﬂuctuations rather than dampening
them, if the effects of policy coincided
with reversion to normal levels of economic
activity.  So, if the aggregate demand and
supply factors were short lived, they would
dissipate before effects of monetary policy
would take hold.  Chairman Greenspan noted,7
The Federal Reserve’s policy actions,
the evidence demonstrates, affect the
ﬁnancial markets immediately, but
work with a signiﬁcant lag of several
quarters or more on output and
employment, and even longer on
prices.  Too often in the past, policy
makers responded late to unfolding
economic developments and found
they were far behind the curve, so 
to speak; as a result, their policy
actions were creating or accentu-
ating business cycles, rather than 
sustaining expansion.
This lagged effect of policy also
implied that the FOMC had to make
policy decisions before measured inﬂation
rose and all evidence of aggregate demand
and supply factors were available.  The
Chairman continued in the same speech,
Those who wish for us, in the current
environment, to await clearly visible
signs of emerging inﬂation before act-
ing are recommending we return to a
failed regime of monetary policy that
cost jobs and living standards.  I wish
it were otherwise, but there is no
alternative to basing policy on what
are, unavoidably, uncertain forecasts.
SUMMARY OF  
FOMC MEETINGS
The struggle to ﬁnd answers to the two
questions posed by Chairman Greenspan
and the FOMC’s decisions about the appro-
priate course of monetary policy was evident
in the minutes of the eight meetings.  (Table
2 summarizes the outcomes of the meetings.)
Throughout the year, the incoming data
showed that the growth rates of monetary
aggregates were near the upper end of
their targets, growth of real output was
greater than that of potential output, and
the unemployment rate was below most
estimates of NAIRU.  All of these factors
hinted at inﬂationary pressures.  Yet, inﬂa-
tion continued to fall throughout the year.
February 4-5
The ﬁrst FOMC meeting of 1997 set
the tone for most of the year.  Incoming
information suggested that economic
activity had increased substantially 
during the fourth quarter of 1996.  The
Commerce Department’s advance estimate
of real GDP growth in the fourth quarter 
of 1996 showed the economy grew at a 
4.7 percent annual rate.  The unemployment
6 Interestingly, the discussions
about changes in productivity
were not noticeable in most
estimates of the growth rate of
potential GDP.  If higher produc-
tivity growth is long lived,
potential GDP should grow
faster than 2 to 21/2 percent.
Yet, forecasters expected real
GDP growth to moderate and
grow at 2 to 21/2 percent with-
in 12 to 18 months.  The
February Humphrey-Hawkins
report’s central tendency of real
GDP growth for 1997 was 2 to
21/4 percent.  The Blue Chip,
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce,
and Ofﬁce of Management and
Budget all forecasted similar
growth rates of potential GDP.
7 Chairman Greenspan gave the
speech at the Haskins Partners
Dinner of the Stern School of
Business, New York University,
on May 8, 1997.
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8 The small size of the policy
action and lack of any other
changes during the remainder
of the year might have reﬂect-
ed the uncertainty expressed by
the committee.  Brainard
(1967) argued that policy
made under uncertainty should
be smaller than one made with
full information.
rate was at 5.3 percent and various measures
of labor compensation also accelerated.  At
the same time, inﬂation showed little change
in its trend.
The members expected the pace of eco-
nomic activity to slow and acknowledged
potential price pressures from high rates of
resource utilization, although recent behavior
deviated from historical patterns. The com-
mittee decided,
an unchanged policy seemed appropri-
ate with inﬂation still quiescent, with
few signs of emerging price pressures,
with growth in economic activity seen
as likely to moderate appreciably from
the unexpectedly strong and unsus-
tainable pace of the fourth quarter.
One potential dampening factor was
the stock market.  Surprisingly, the
committee viewed the stock market as a
source of potential strength or weakness
for the economy.  The continuing increase
in equity prices added signiﬁcantly to con-
sumer’s wealth and therefore provided the
wherewithal to support higher spending.
But, the stock market could have fallen,
diminished household wealth, and had 
the opposite effect on spending.
March 25
The data prior to the March 25th
meeting showed “widespread statistical
and anecdotal evidence that the surprising
strength in economic activity over the
closing months of 1996 was persisting in
1997.”  Moreover, the committee and fore-
casters expected the economy to slow, but
“they felt that substantial uncertainty sur-
rounded the timing and extent of such
slowing in the quarters ahead.”  Still, the
continued strength of the economy
increased the risk of inﬂation, given the
already high levels of resource utilization.
“However, the risks of a rise in inﬂation
down the road had increased appreciably
as a result of the strength of aggregate
demand and the increase in pressures on
resources that likely would accompany it
absent a ﬁrming in ﬁnancial conditions.”
These concerns led the committee to
act preemptively by raising the intended
federal funds target by 25 basis points to
5.5 percent.  This would be the only
change of the year.8
In this situation, they saw a clear need
for a preemptive policy action that
would head off any pickup of inﬂa-
tion, and it was noted that a shift to a
tighter policy stance would seem to
pose little risk to the expansion.
Indeed, by countering any tendency
for inﬂation to rise and for higher
inﬂation expectations to become
embedded in ﬁnancial markets and
economic decision-making more gen-
erally, such action would help head off
a more abrupt economic slowing, or
even a downturn, and thereby would
Summary of FOMC Decisions
Directive for
Date  Reserve Pressure  Intermeeting Stance  Dissent
2/4-5  maintain  asymmetric (tighter)  none
3/25  increase slightly  symmetric  none
5/20  maintain  asymmetric (tighter)  Broaddus
7/1-2  maintain  asymmetric (tighter)  none
8/19  maintain  asymmetric (tighter)  none
9/30  maintain  asymmetric (tighter)  none
11/12  maintain  asymmetric (tighter)  Broaddus
12/16  maintain  symmetric  Broaddus
Table 2FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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help sustain the expansion and pre-
serve the ﬁrm labor markets and 
their associated beneﬁts.9
The FOMC released an unusually
long statement after the meeting to 
explain its action: 10
The Federal Open Market Committee
decided today to tighten money mar-
ket conditions slightly, expecting the
federal funds rate to rise 
1 –
4 percentage
point to around 5
1 –
2 percent.
This action was taken in light of per-
sisting strength in demand, which is
progressively increasing the risk of
inﬂationary imbalances developing in
the economy that would eventually
undermine the long expansion.
In these circumstances, the slight
ﬁrming of monetary conditions is
viewed as a prudent step that affords
greater assurance of prolonging the
current economic expansion by sus-
taining the existing low inﬂation envi-
ronment through the rest of this year
and next.  The experience of the last
several years has reinforced the con-
viction that low inﬂation is essential
to realizing the economy’s fullest
growth potential.
No change was made in the Federal
Reserve discount rate, which remains
at 5 percent.
May 20
The economy showed some signs of
slowing, although the committee members
believed there was underlying strength in
the economy.  Consumer spending rose at
a slower pace as did increases in payroll
employment.  Industrial production was
unchanged between March and April.
Still, they found the high resource utiliza-
tion rates and low inﬂation nexus puzzling.
[T]he members found it very difﬁcult
to account for the surprisingly benign
behavior of inﬂation in an economy
that had been operating at a level
approximating full employment,
indeed, possibly somewhat above sus-
tainable full employment in labor
markets in the view of a number of
members, especially taking into con-
sideration the recent further decline in
the unemployment rate.  On the basis
of historical patterns, any overshoot-
ing of full employment would be
expected to generate rising inﬂation
over time.  Although increases in
labor compensation had been trending
higher, these pressures were muted
and had not shown through to prices.
In light of continuing uncertainty and
the absence of inﬂation, the committee
decided not to change the federal funds
target.  Not all were in agreement, however.
Mr. Broaddus dissented because he
believed that the strength of invest-
ment demand, due possibly to an
increase in the trend growth rate of
productivity, required somewhat high-
er real interest rates to prevent inﬂa-
tionary pressures from developing.
He was concerned that, with the econ-
omy already operating at a high level
and labor markets apparently very
tight, any increase in such pressures
might be costly to reverse and might
reduce the credibility of the
Committee’s longer run strategy of
promoting maximum sustainable
growth by fostering price level stabili-
ty.  He also believed that the risk to
the economy of a moderate further
tightening was small given the appar-
ent momentum of aggregate economic
activity.
July 1-2
Incoming data suggested that
economic activity during the second
quarter was substantially slower than the
ﬁrst.  The committee interpreted this as a
general return to the potential growth rate
of the economy over the following six
9 Friedman (1968) and Phelps
(1968) show that a simple
Phillips curve misses the impor-
tance of expectations in deter-
mining any relationship
between unemployment and
inﬂation.  Lucas (1973)
extends the analysis by incorpo-
rating rational expectations
which showed that a stable
relationship between inﬂation
and unemployment need not
exist if agents rationally antici-
pate policy maker’s actions.
Kyland and Prescott (1977),
Calvo (1978), Kreps and
Wilson (1982), Barro and
Gordon (1983) and Barro
(1986) show the importance
of reputation and time inconsis-
tency in determining the wel-
fare costs of monetary policy
actions.
10Prior to 1994 the committee
did not make any announce-
ments about policy decisions.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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quarters.  Still, the members viewed faster
growth as a risk to their forecast.  The
committee also discussed productivity
improvements.
More fundamentally, [the low inﬂation]
presumably also involved the favorable
effects on production costs of wide-
spread business restructuring and the
large volume of investment in more
productive technology in recent years,
the impact of both factors on the job
security concerns of workers and their
willingness to accept reduced increases
in compensation, and the effects of an
intense degree of competition among
domestic and foreign producers in U.S.
markets.  With regard to the possibility
that more robust productivity increases
would be holding down production
costs, it was noted that a surge in eco-
nomic activity, such as had occurred in
late 1996 and early 1997, tended to be
accompanied by above-trend gains in
productivity.  A slower pace of econom-
ic growth in the second quarter and
beyond might provide an opportunity
to assess whether productivity increases
were on a clear up trend and could help
to explain the favorable behavior of
prices over an extended period.  In any
event, it was too early to reach any ﬁrm
conclusion on this issue or the broader
question of whether or when a rise in
inﬂation might materialize under antic-
ipated economic conditions.
The FOMC members also discussed
their outlook for 1997 and 1998.  Their
forecasts for real GDP growth for 1997 and
1998 showed central tendencies of 3 to 3
1 –
4
percent and 2 to 2
1 –
2 percent, respectively.
They also saw the unemployment rate within
a range of 4
3 –
4 to 5 percent for both years,





for 1997 and 2
1 –
2 to 3 percent for 1998. 
August 19
A new concern for the committee 
surfaced during this meeting, the growth
of inventories.
The uncertain prospects for inventory
investment were a dominant factor in
the outlook for economic activity over
the nearer term.  The accumulation of
inventories had been unusually high
in the second quarter according to the
available evidence.  There was no broad
sense of an undesired buildup, but the
rate of inventory investment would
have to be reined in if an overhang
were to be averted.  A concern in this
regard was that the apparent upturn in
ﬁnal demand, particularly if it proved
to be somewhat stronger than currently
expected, and related business opti-
mism about sales prospects might well
result in a further buildup of invento-
ries at a relatively rapid rate.  While
such a development was not viewed as
the most likely outcome and, indeed,
less-than-projected strength in the
inventory sector could not be ruled
out, relatively rapid inventory accu-
mulation in the context of persisting
above-trend growth in ﬁnal demand
would generate additional pressure on
resources and heighten the risks of
accelerating inﬂation.
The discussion during the meeting
also mentioned high, real short-term
interest rates as a possible damper on
activity.11 The Fisher equation states that
nominal and real interest rates differ by
expected inﬂation.  Using actual inﬂation
as a proxy for expected inﬂation, the real
federal funds rate rose sharply during
1997.  Indeed Chairman Greenspan would
later acknowledge the possibility of a pas-
sive tightening in his February 1998
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony.
Although the nominal federal funds
rate was maintained after March, the
apparent drop in inﬂation expectations
over the balance of 1997 induced some
ﬁrming in the stance of monetary poli-
cy by one important measure—the real
federal funds rate, or the nominal fed-
eral funds rate less a proxy for inﬂation
expectations.  Some analysts have
dubbed the contribution of the reduc-
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1998
11The minutes from the May 20
meeting also make a passing
reference to high real interest
rates.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
37
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1998
tion in inﬂation expectations to raising
the real federal funds rate a ‘passive’
tightening, in that it increased the
amount of monetary policy restraint in
place without an explicit vote by the
FOMC.  While the tightening may
have been passive in that sense, it was
by no means inadvertent.  Members of
the FOMC took some comfort in the
upward trend of the real federal funds
rate over the year and the rise in the
foreign exchange value of the dollar
because such additional restraint was
viewed as appropriate given the
strength of spending and building
strains on labor resources.
The directive issued to the Open
Market Desk at this meeting made an
explicit reference to the intended federal
funds target for the ﬁrst time.  Previous
directives only mentioned possible
changes to reserve pressure.
September 30
The pace of economic activity acceler-
ated again after a slow second quarter.
Still, the committee delayed making any
further changes in policy.
There were, nonetheless, a number of
reasons for delaying a tightening of
policy.  The behavior of inﬂation had
been unexpectedly benign for an
extended period of time for reasons
that were not fully understood.
Forecasts of an upturn in inﬂation
were therefore subject to a consider-
able degree of uncertainty, and the
expansion of economic activity could
still slow to a noninﬂationary pace.
Members also commented that a policy
tightening was not anticipated at this
time and such an action might there-
fore have unintended adverse effects
on ﬁnancial markets.  Members recog-
nized that from the standpoint of the
level of real short-term interest rates,
monetary policy could already be
deemed to be fairly restrictive. Several
noted, however, that credit from a wide
variety of lenders appeared to be amply
available in ﬁnancial markets on favor-
able terms, perhaps overly so in present
circumstances, and some also noted
that the strength in the broad measures
of money in recent months suggested
that policy was not restraining liquidity
or ﬁnancial conditions more generally.
In the course of the Committee’s dis-
cussion of these diverging considera-
tions, a consensus emerged for
maintaining a steady policy course at
this time, but members also expressed
the need for a heightened degree of
vigilance as they continued to assess
ongoing developments for signs that
inﬂation might intensify in the future.
November 12
The continued strength of the economy
continued to worry the FOMC.  “[T]he
members agreed that there remained a
clear risk of additional pressures on already
tight resources and ultimately on prices that
could well need to be curbed by tighter
monetary policy.”  But they found
themselves more concerned about a new
development, a crisis in Asia.12 “Turmoil
in Asian ﬁnancial markets and economies
would tend to damp output and prices in
the United States.  To date, it appeared that
the effects on the U.S. economy would be
quite limited, but the ultimate extent of
the adjustment in Asia was unknown, as
was its spillover to global ﬁnancial markets
and to the economies of nations that were
important U.S. trading partners.”13
In light of the uncertainty and absence
of inﬂation the committee decided to leave
policy unchanged.  But once again,
Mr. Broaddus dissented because he
believed that a modest tightening of
policy would be prudent in view of the
recent strength in aggregate demand
for goods and services; such demand
appeared to be growing considerably
more rapidly than the sustainable rate
at which it could be supplied without
an increase in inﬂation.  While he rec-
12The crisis in Asia started several
months earlier in early summer
with the devaluation of the 
Thai baht.
13There was considerable uncer-
tainty about the effects of the
crisis.  Several forecasts issued
at the end of the year showed
slower growth in the Asian
countries.  The crisis’ effect on
the U.S. centered on two
effects.  First, forecasters
expected export of goods pro-
duced in the U.S. to the affect-
ed countries to decrease, but
direct trade between the U.S.
and the affected countries was
relatively small.  Second, the
crisis might induce slower
growth in Japan and other
countries that were larger trad-
ing partners of the U.S. as
demand for their exports fell.
This created another channel
for the Asian crisis to affect the
U.S. economy.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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ognized that a tightening at this meet-
ing presented risks in view of recent
ﬁnancial and economic developments
in East Asia, he believed these risks
were outweighed by the risk that poli-
cy would have to be tightened more
aggressively if action were delayed,
demand remained robust, and the
recent apparent reduction in inﬂation-
ary expectations were reversed.  The
negative impact on economic activity
in such circumstances would be
markedly greater than if a more modest
action were taken at this meeting.
December 16
The year ended much as it started.
“[M]embers commented on indications that
growth in economic activity had remained
solid and that inﬂation had continued to be
surprisingly low.”
More importantly, the Asian crisis 
continued to worry the committee.
However, the effects of the persisting
turmoil in Asian ﬁnancial markets
were likely to moderate the pace of
expansion, though the extent of this
effect was difﬁcult to judge.  The
ongoing turbulence since the last
Committee meeting, which included
further noticeable increases in the dol-
lar against the currencies of affected
countries, likely would have a some-
what greater damping effect on output
and prices in the United States than
previously had been anticipated.
Exports to many Asian countries, and
possibly to other U.S. trading partners
whose economies might be adversely
affected by the spillover effects of devel-
opments in Asia, would be reduced,
and declines in import prices would
ease inﬂation pressures.  However, the
ultimate extent of the adjustment in
Asian economies remained unknown,
and more substantial downward pres-
sure on the economies of the United
States and its trading partners could 
not be ruled out.
The uncertainty surrounding the 
economic outlook led the committee to change
the asymmetric, intermeeting directive that
had been in place for most of the year.
A majority of the members indicated a
preference for a shift to a symmetrical
directive even though many contin-
ued to anticipate that the next policy
move was likely to be in a tightening
direction.  They noted that while the
probability of any policy change in the
near term was very low, uncertainties
in the outlook had increased, and they
could not rule out the possibility that
the next change might be in the direc-
tion of some easing if, contrary to cur-
rent expectations, the turmoil in Asia
were to intensify to the extent that it
seemed likely to exert very substantial
effects on the U.S. economy.  A sym-
metric directive would position the
Committee to respond ﬂexibly in
either direction to unanticipated
developments in the period ahead.
But all were not in agreement.
Mr. Broaddus dissented because he
continued to believe that a modest
tightening of policy would be prudent
in light of the apparent persisting
strength in aggregate demand for
goods and services.  He recognized
the case for holding policy steady
given recent developments in East
Asian economies and ﬁnancial mar-
kets; he believed, however, that a
slight ﬁrming at this meeting would
provide valuable insurance against the
risk that demand growth might
remain above a sustainable trend and
require a sharper policy response later.
He thought further that the potential
beneﬁts of this insurance outweighed
the risk that such an action would
have a signiﬁcant negative impact on
U.S. economic activity.  He also
believed that signaling a greater will-
ingness to tolerate modest policy
adjustments in response to emerging
developments would foster more ﬂexi-FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  ST. LOUIS
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ble movements in longer term ﬁnan-
cial markets, and speciﬁcally enable
longer term interest rates to play their
traditional role as automatic stabiliz-
ers for the economy more effectively.
CONCLUSION
Although the economic performance
of the U.S. economy in 1997 was very good,
it was in at least one respect troubling for
the FOMC.  Traditional signals of inﬂation
—rapid money growth and high levels of
economic activity—were not accompanied
by higher inﬂation.  Rather, inﬂation fell
steadily throughout the year.
The committee put forth several
hypotheses for the subdued inﬂation but
found the situation puzzling, nevertheless.
Compounding the problem, the members
did not know how long such dampening
factors would last, and thus did not know
if policy actions would exacerbate a
foreseen slowdown of the economy.  In the
end the FOMC changed the intended fed-
eral funds target once and then searched
anxiously for the answers to the
conundrum they faced in 1997.
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